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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
COMPELLING A SENIOR LIENOR
TO PURSUE REMEDIES AGAINST
A GUARANTOR-A
MISAPPLICATION OF THE
MARSHALING DOCTRINE

Assume that a creditor is owed
$100,000 and has a senior security
interest in the debtor's equipment
valued at $100,000, as well as a
personal guarantee of another entity secured by a lien on the
guarantor's assets also valued at
$100,000. Another creditor who is
owed $25,000 has a junior security
interest in the same equipment
owned by the debtor, but has
no personal guarantee. Upon the
debtor's liquidation in bankruptcy, if the senior lienor proceeds against the debtor's equipment without proceeding against
the guarantor, it is easy to see that
the junior lienor would be considered an unsecured creditor in the
bankruptcy case and there would
be no equity in the equipment left
for general creditors. But if the
senior lienor fully recovers from
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; associate member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.

the personal guarantor, the junior
lienor would be treated as a fully
secured creditor and, upon liquidation, general creditors would
share in the $75,000 remaining
equity in the equipment.
This scenario raises two important questions: (1) whether the
junior lienor may compel the
senior lienor to exhaust its remedies against property owned by
the personal guarantor based on
the doctrine of the marshaling
of assets and (2) whether the
trustee may compel the senior
lienor to exhaust its remedies
against the guarantor's assets
based on the marshaling doctrine,
so as to maximize recovery
by unsecured creditors. Although
affirmative answers to both these
questions are supported by the
1979 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in In
re Jack Green's Fashions for
Men-Big & Tall, Inc., 1 compelling the senior lienor to pursue the
guarantor's assets is a misapplication of the marshaling of assets
doctrine.
Marshalling in Principle

The marshaling doctrine may
be stated as follows: If a senior
I
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FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

lienor has a lien that exfends to
and covers two funds or potential
1 funds owned by the debtor, and if
a junior lienor has recourse to
only one of those funds to satisfy
the debt due t<i him, the senior
lienor may be required to qhaust
the fund available to him exclusively before proceeding against
the fund that is also available to
the junior lienor. 2 The principle
underlying-this. doctrine was described py the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. United States 3 :
[T]he equitable doctrine of marshaling [sic] rests upon the principle
that a creditor having two funds to
satisfy his debt, may no~bybis application of them to his demand,
defeat another creditor, who may
resort to only one of the funds. (Citation omhted.)

* * *
[M]arshaling is not bottomed on
the law of contracts or liens. It is
founded instead in equity, being
designed to promote fair dealing
and justice .... It deals with the
rights of all who have an interest in
property involved and is applied
only when it can be equitably
fashioned as to all of the parties. 4

business ~ssets tof a. corporate
debtor, as well as liens on reaP
estate ~wned by the 'Controlling
'shareholders of' the. corporation'
and their wives who. were guarantors of th€ corpo~ate .obligation.
The trustee in the,. corporllt'ion' s "'
bankruptcy· case sought ·an 'order"
compelling the bank to exhaust. fts "
remedips against the real estate
owned by the guarantors ,bef01;e
, resorting, to· the corporation:'s
business assets. Of course, th,e
trustee was attempting to ,maximize corporate! assets available
for distribution to unsecured•
creditors by forcing the. bank to
obtain payment from assets, that
' were unavailale to the bankruptcy
estate. Without extensive discus-,
sion, except for reference to' the
district court's unpubli'shed opinion, the court of appt<.a,ls affirmetl
the decisions of the 'lower courtS""
granting the trus,~ee's 1llarshalfng'
request.
In this case i~ wOuld be in the highest degree inequitable to <Vlow the
Bank to exhaust the business assets
of the corporate bankrupt without
first looking to the real >estafe
mortgaged
it. T,o permit such a
course would leave the general
creditors of the business with nothing.5
·

·to

In the Jack Green 1s case, a
bank had a security interest in the
2 See, e.g., DuPage Lumber & Home
Improvement Center Co., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp/" 34 Bankr. 737 (N.D.
Ill. 1983); In re McE1waney, 40
Bankr. 66 (M.D. Ga. 1984); In re United
Retail Corp., 33 Bankr. 150 (D. Hawaii
1983).
3 '375 u.s. 233 (1963).
4 /d. at 236-237.

J'hree Criticisms of fack Green's.
The holding in Jack Green's i~
stili alive in the Eighth Circuit,
but it is not doing 'Yell in other '
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courts. 6 Th~e ar'e three reasons
why the ~ourt \ misapplied the
marshaling of assets doctrine and
why· other; courts have rejected
the holding of that case.
First, the doctrine applies when
there are two or more lien creditors. U~secured creditor~ have no
right to compel a secured creditor
'to resort to certain collateral as
opposed to .other collateral. In
Jack ·Greefl's, the bank was the
only secured creditor and it was
the trustee, as representative of
the unsecured creditors, who
sought the 1marshaling order. Apparently, although not expressly
stating it, the cou'rt recogpized the
trustee as having judicial lien creditor status pursuant to Section
70(c) of the former Bankruptcy
Act. 7 However, many courts have
rejected the notion that the trustee,
as a hypothetical lien creditor
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under Section 70(c) of the former Act or Section 544(a) of the
present Bankruptcy Code, has
standing to compel the marshaling of assets. As hoted by the bankruptcy court in In re McElwaney, 8
'~[t]o 'allow the Trustee to invoke the marshaling doctrine, by
vir,tue of his status as a hypothetical lien creditor would be a use
of the strong-arm clause not contemplated by Congress." Another
court, in In re Larry's Equipment
Service, Inc., 9 had commented:
Marshaling is not equitable if applied for the benefit of a· ttustee
to the detriment of a se~ured and
properly Qerfectedjunior lien creditor. To permit marshaling in the
manner sought by the trustee, in
this case, would frustrate the objective of the Bankuptcy Code and
conflict with the doctrine itself by
prejudicing the rigbts of a superior
class of creditors. 10

The second criticism of the

See, e.g., In re Computer Room, Inc.,
24 Bankr. 732 (N.D. Ala. 1982); DuPage Jack Green's decisipn focuses on
Lumber & ·Home Improvement Center the so-called common debtor reCo., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 34 quirement. nA necessary element
Bankr. 737 ,(N.D. Ill. 1983); see also
Karasik It Kolodney, "The Doctrine of for imposing the marshaling docMarshaling Under the Bankruptcy Code,'' trine is that one debtor has two
89 Com. L.J. 102 (1984).
funds and that one secured credi7 See also In re Spectra Prism Indus.,
Inc., 28 Bankr. 397 (9th Cir. App. Panel tor has liens on both funds while a
1983), holding that the trustee may use its junior lienor has a lien on oflly one
lien creditor status under § 544(a) to block fund: 11 When a creditor has a lien
a marshaling order requested by a junior
lienor. The Spectra Prism case was on assets owned by the principal
criticized by the authors in Weintraub &
8 40 Bankr. ,66, 70-71 (M.D. Ga. 1984).
Resnick, "Marslialirig of Assets in Bank9
ruptcy' Cases: The ~pecter of Constance v.
23 Bankr. 132 (D. Me. 1982).
10
Harv~y Appears Again," 16 U.C.C.L.J.
Id. at 134; see also In re Computer
1384 (1984). Nonetheless, the recent case of Room, Inc., 24 Bankr. 732 (N.D. Ala.
In re Center W)lolesale, Inc., 759 F.2d' 1982).
11
1440 (9th Cir. 1985) follows the majority
See, e.g., In re Childers, 44 Bankr. 23
opiniorr of In re Spectra Prism Indus., (N.D. Ala. 1984); In re Maimone, 41
supra.
Bankr. 974, 984 (D.N.J. 1984) ("This doc6
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marshaling is not applicable where
there .will b~ 'prejudice to the
senior creditot, such~ as delay
and increased expenses. 14 In the
usual case, pursl)ing guarantors.
requires the , commencement of
separate litigation, foreclosure
proceedings, and other expensive·
and time-consuming procedures.
It would be ironic,t as well
as inconsistent with the Unifor~·
Commercial Code's policy of giving secured partie:; cumulative,
remedies, 15 for a secured Jentle~
to be prevented or delayed in recovering agaj~st the principal
debtor solely because it took the
extra precaution of obtaining a
personal guarantee.

debtor, and a lien,on as§ets owned
by a guarantor, the "common
debtor'' requirement is missing.
In DuPage Lumber & Home Improvement Center Co., Inc. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 12 a district court emphasized the importance of adhering to the common
debtor requirement:

The requirement that both funds be
in the hands of a common debtor is
not merely a formal or technical requirement; rather, it limits marshaling to cases for which the marshaling doctrine purports to provide the
rule of decision. The marshaling
doctrine embodies and implements
a judgment as to the proper distribution of one debtor's assets, as
among a senior mortgagee, a junior
mortgagee, and the debtor's genConclusion
eral creditors. When guarantors
and other debtors are added to the
Except in rare cases ·Wher~
picture, then new questions arise. fraud or other inequitable'conduct
The marshaling doctrine simply justifies piercing the corporate
does not purport to provide a
veil so as to treat a corporate
rule for deciding whether a junior
debtor and a shareholder guaran~
mortgagee can require the senior
16
• mortgagee to satisfy its claim out of tor as the same entity, the mar~
shaling of assets doctrine should
the assets of a second debtor. 13

The third critfcism of the Jack
Green's decision is that the court
overlooked or minimized the et'fects of the added expense and inconvenience that the marshaling
order would cause the secured
creditor by having to pursue
remedies against the guarantors'
real estate. Courts have held that
trine obviously cannot be applied, however, when the other asset is also owned or
liened by 'parties other than the debtor.'').
12 34 Bankr. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
u Id. at 740-741.

14 See, e.g., In re Urtited Retail Corp.,
33 Bankr. 150 (D. Hawaii 1983); In re
Leonardo, 11 Bankr. 453 ()V.D.N.Y.
1981).
15 See U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
16 "Facts sufficient to sustain a piercing
of the corporate veil may establish independent and separate equities which may
overcome a deficiency in the common
debtor requirement." In re Rich Supply
House, Inc., 43 Bankr. 68, 70 (N.D. Ill.
1984); see also In re United Medical Research, Inc., 12 Bankr. 941 (C.D, Cal.
1981); Karasik & Kolodney, "The Doctrine of Marshaling Under the Bankruptcy
Code," 89 Com. L.J. 102 (1984).
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not be used to +compel a secured "creditor to pursue temedies..
against a guarantor's assets. Application <?f,~the marshaling doctrine tb compel foreclosure on a
-guadmtor.'s :property .violates 1he
common debtor requirement and
" the senior lienor addiimposes on
tiona~ e'xpenses and undue delay
in ·obtaining payment. In any
event, the trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor under Section
544(a) sh9uld pot have standing
t.6 seek marshaling. Giving the
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trustee such. standing goes well
beyond· the policy of 'Section
544(a), which is to allow the
trustee. to avoid,secret or unperfected security interests. The ap-.
plication of the marshaling doctrine in bankruptcy cases should
be limited to situations where
there are two actual1ien creditors
and where the seni~r creditor has
liens on two funds owned by the
debtor, while the junior creditor
has .a lien on only one of those
funds.
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